The Emerging Aversion to Inequality: Evidence from Poland 1992-2005 by Irena Grosfeld & Claudia Senik
Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
Materials published here have a working paper character. They can be subject to further 
publication. The views and opinions expressed here reflect the author point of view and not 
necessarily those of CASE Network. 
The publication was financed from a institutional grant extended by Rabobank Polska S.A. 
We thank Malgorzata Kalbarczyk for outstanding research assistance and Jolanta Sommer 
for help with the data. We are grateful to Andrew Clark and Marc Gurgand for useful 
discussions and to participants at the "Economics of Behaviour and Decision Making" 
seminar (London Business School, London School of Economics, University College London, 
and Westminster Business School) for comments. We thank CEPREMAP for financial 
support. 
Key words: inequality, subjective well-being, breakpoint, transition. 
JEL codes: C25, D31, I30, P20, P26. 
© CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw,  2008 
 
Graphic Design: Agnieszka Natalia Bury 
 
 





CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research  on behalf of CASE Network 
12 Sienkiewicza, 00-010 Warsaw, Poland 
tel.: (48 22) 622 66 27, fax: (48 22) 828 60 69 
e-mail: case@case-research.eu 
http://www.case-research.eu 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 360 The Emerging Aversion to Inequality. Evidence from Poland 1992-2005 
 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 360 
2
This report is part of the CASE Network Studies and Analyses series.  
The CASE Network is a group of economic and social research centers in Poland, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus. Organizations in the network regularly 
conduct joint research and advisory projects. The research covers a wide spectrum of 
economic and social issues, including economic effects of the European integration process, 
economic relations between the EU and CIS, monetary policy and euro-accession, 
innovation and competitiveness, and labour markets and social policy. The network aims to 
increase the range and quality of economic research and information available to policy-
makers and civil society, and takes an active role in on-going debates on how to meet the 
economic challenges facing the EU, post-transition countries and the global economy. 
 
The CASE network consists of:  
 
•  CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, est. 1991,  
             www.case-research.eu 
 
•  CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research – Kyrgyzstan, est. 1998, 
www.case.elcat.kg 
 
•  Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE Ukraine, est. 1999,  
      www.case-ukraine.kiev.ua 
 
•  CASE –Transcaucasus Center for Social and Economic Research, est. 2000,  
             www.case-transcaucasus.org.ge  
•  Foundation for Social and Economic Research CASE Moldova, est. 2003,                   
www.case.com.md 
 











1. LITERATURE .................................................................................................................................. 9 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN POLAND............................................ 10 
3. DATA................................................................................................................................................ 14 
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY............................................................................................................. 17 
5. RESULTS......................................................................................................................................... 18 











 The Emerging Aversion to Inequality. Evidence from Poland 1992-2005 
 












Irena Grosfeld is Research Director at Paris School of Economics and the National Centre 
for Scientific Research. She received  a Master degree from the University  of  Warsaw and 
PhD from Université Paris-I Sorbonne. She is a member of the CASE Advisory Council. Her 
main field of research is corporate finance and corporate governance, privatization, 
institutional change and public economics. 
e-mail: grosfeld@pse.ens.fr 
 
Claudia Senik is Professor of Economics at the Paris School of Economics and the 
University Paris-Sorbonne. She is also member of the IZA and of the Institut Universitaire de 
France. Educated at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, she received her PhD from EHESS. Her 
main research areas include public economics, happiness studies and post-transition 
economies, with a special interest in the subjective welfare effects of income distribution. 












This paper provides an illustration of the changing tolerance for inequality in a context of 
radical political and economic transformation and rapid economic growth. We focus on the 
Polish transition experience, and explore individuals' self-reported attitudes. Using unusually 
long and frequent (monthly) representative surveys of the population, carried out by the 
Polish poll institute (CBOS) from 1992 to 2005, we identify a structural break in the 
relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being. The downturn in the 
tolerance for inequality (1997) coincides with increasing distrust of political elites. 
5
 The Emerging Aversion to Inequality. Evidence from Poland 1992-2005 
 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 360 
6
“The rulers are not necessarily given any advance notice about (…) 
the time at which they ought to be on the lookout for a drastically 
different climate of public and popular opinion; on the contrary, they 
are lulled into complacency by the easy early stage when everybody 
seems to be enjoying the very process that will later be vehemently 
denounced and damned as one consisting essentially in “the rich 
becoming richer” (Hirschman and Rothschild , 1973, p.552). 
 
Introduction 
Does rising inequality spoil the welfare benefits of growth? And if so, can it reduce popular 
support for economic reforms? In this paper, we show that during a period of rapid economic 
growth, accompanied by a substantial rise in income inequality, tolerance for inequality 
evolved to become a major factor of unhappiness and dissatisfaction. De facto, “reform 
fatigue” and disenchantment (Kornai, 2006; Desai and Olofsgärd, 2006) appeared after a 
number of years of significant achievements in the Central and Eastern European countries, 
which engaged in a process of profound political and economic transformation at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Despite notable successes in establishing democratic and market 
institutions, continuous economic growth and increasing prosperity, and joining NATO and 
the European Union, the mood of public opinion changed at the end of the last century. 
Growing tensions between democracy and liberalism and the rise of populist parties were 
observed in a number of countries in the region (Krastev, 2007). This popular discontent was 
fueled by increasing public distrust of political elites, who were viewed as corrupt and self-
interested.  
We focus on the Polish experience, which, after 45 years of Communism, engaged in a 
process of radical transformation in 1989 (Sachs, 1993). This peaceful and negotiated 
“refolution”, i.e. a combination of gradual reforms and revolutionary change (Garton Ash, 
1989), consisting of the twin transitions towards democracy and a market economy, brought 
about radical changes in attitudes and expectations. Initially, the process relied on high 
expectations and massive support from the population. Immense hopes were entrusted in 
the mere abandon of Socialism.  In the middle of the 1990s, however, this consensual period 
started to come to an end, and initial enthusiasm gave way to disappointment: expectations 
began to be confronted with experience. Criticism of some of the transition outcomes, 
including corruption, growing inequality (Brainerd, 1998; Milanovic, 1998, 1999; Kornai, Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
2006) and the high price paid by the losers, progressively became the dominant theme of 
public discourse.  
In a premonitory paper, Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) suggested that societies 
experiencing rapid development may initially show tolerance for higher inequality, as this is 
interpreted in terms of greater opportunities. The increase in others' income  is then 
considered as encouraging information about the individual's own prospects. However, the 
authors also argued that this tolerance for inequality may wither away over time: if 
expectations are not met, supporters of the development process may become its enemies. 
This may also happen when people acquire a more accurate idea of their place and destiny 
in society. After such a “turning point”, the side-effects of development, and in particular the 
increase in inequality, may swamp the subjective benefits of growth. 
 Most of the existing literature has documented the relation between income inequality and 
satisfaction in given environments, sometimes in a comparative static way contrasting 
Europe and the United-States (Alesina et al., 2004) or Old Europe versus New Europe and 
the United States (Senik, forthcoming). The experience of eighteen years of transition now 
makes it possible to investigate how the relation between inequality and satisfaction evolved 
over time in one country.  
Taking advantage of an unusually long Polish dataset with high frequency (bi-monthly), 
covering the period 1992 - 2005, we here explore the evolution of subjective attitudes of the 
Polish citizens during the initial and later stages of transition. We hinge on their self-declared 
satisfaction with the state of the Polish economy (henceforth “country satisfaction”), which is 
both a satisfaction domain and a political attitude. We also use two other self-declared 
satisfaction variables: 1) “satisfaction with the living conditions of one’s family (henceforth 
“private satisfaction”); and 2) expectations concerning the living conditions of one’s family in 
the near future (“private expectations”). 
The main objective of this paper is to test whether the scenario sketched by Hirschman and 
Rothschild can explain the surprising hump shape of average satisfaction in Poland, in the 
context of strong and stable national income growth. As shown in Figure 1 (Section 3), 
individual satisfaction, especially satisfaction with the economic situation of the country, 
initially followed the rise in GDP, but at a certain point around 1996-1997, became uncoupled 
7
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from it and even started to decline.  
If this phenomenon can be explained by Hirschman and Rothschild’s conjecture, we should 
be able to identify a structural break in the relationship between satisfaction and inequality 
over time: in the first period, country satisfaction and private expectations should rise with 
inequality as the latter is essentially interpreted as an increase in opportunities; however, in a 
second stage the impact of income inequality should become negative. We test for the 
existence of such a breakpoint, not by imposing a specific date but by looking over the entire 
series and using the sup-Wald test (Andrews 1993) to identify breakpoint existence and 
location. 
The results show that the breakpoint is situated at the end of 1996. Consequently, we 
consider the relationship between income inequality and satisfaction before and after this 
point. Popular satisfaction with the country’s economic situation initially rises with income 
inequality, but falls with inequality in the later period. The relationship between income 
inequality and individuals’ expectations concerning the future situation of their households 
follows a similar pattern: in the first period, inequality is associated with higher expectations; 
in the second period, it no longer affects expectations, suggesting that it lost its informational 
value in the eyes of the population. Finally, income inequality significantly reduces private 
satisfaction after 1996, whereas it has no significant impact before that date. 
  Dissatisfaction with the economic situation of the country is also reflected in political 
attitudes. We find that the percentage of people who position themselves at the extremes of 
the political spectrum has significantly increased since 1996. More evidence on the evolution 
of public opinion suggests that the changing tolerance for inequality coincided with the 
growing perception that high incomes reflect corruption and other unfair phenomena.   
The following section reviews the related literature, and Section 2 summarizes the evolution 
of the political situation in Poland. Section 3 presents the data, Section 4 discusses the 
empirical strategy, and Section 5 presents the results. Last, Section 6 concludes. 
 Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
 
 1. Literature  
This paper is located at the cross-roads of several relevant strands of the literature. It is 
motivated by work in the political economy of development that focuses on income inequality. 
A frequent claim is that inequality and the resulting demand for redistribution constitute an 
obstacle to economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994): 
income distribution concerns may discourage individuals' adhesion to the deepening of 
market reforms or development policies, when growth produces income inequality, as 
suggested by the Kuznets curve. Alesina and Perotti (1993) provide empirical evidence that 
income inequality fuels social discontent and instability. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 
2002) argue that much of the historical evolutions of Nineteenth Century Europe, in particular 
the extension of voting rights that led to unprecedented redistributive programs, can be 
viewed as a strategy by the elite to avoid political discontent and revolution, which was in 
turn fed by the rising inequalities from economic development and industrialization. 
We address this issue with the tools of the “happiness literature” that analyzes individuals' 
self-declared satisfaction and attitudes. The paper is first related to a large body of literature 
on the relationship between income distribution and self-rated happiness. Most work finds 
that individuals’ inequality aversion depends on their perception of income mobility, i.e. on 
their beliefs regarding the factors of economic success and failure (Alesina et al. 2001; Fong 
2001; Alesina and la Ferrara 2005; Alesina and Angeletos 2005). Alesina et al. (2004) show 
that inequality does not affect the life satisfaction of Americans, while it reduces the self-
declared happiness of Europeans; this is because "… in the U.S., the poor see inequality as 
a ladder that, although steep, may be climbed, while in Europe the poor see that ladder as 
more difficult to ascend". Sanfey and Teksoz (2007) analyze transition countries, also finding 
that income inequality has a positive effect on life satisfaction, whereas the impact is 
negative in other countries from the World Values Survey.  
One of the key questions in the happiness literature is the subjective welfare impact of 
income: both own income and the income distribution. The principal motivation here is the 
so-called Easterlin paradox, i.e. the empirical observation that national average self-declared 
happiness does not increase with national income (Easterlin 2001). The current paper shares 
9
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this type of concern, as its objective is to explain why satisfaction in Poland fell in the late-
1990’s, even though GDP continued to increase.  
Other articles at the intersection of the growing happiness literature and the vast transition 
literature have analyzed the structure and evolution of satisfaction during transition. These 
include, inter alia, Easterlin and Zimmermann (2006); Guriev and Zhuravskaia (2007) and 
Easterlin (2008). One of the principal issues addressed by these papers is the weaker 
relation, ceteris paribus, between GDP and life satisfaction in transition than in non-transition 
countries. Other papers have used the experience of transition as a sort of giant "natural 
experiment" in order to consider the welfare effects of more specific changes, such as 
increased household income (Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Frijters, Haisken-de-New and 
Shields, 2004), inequality (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001; Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln, 
2007) and income comparisons (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Senik, 2004).  
Following the research program initiated by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973), we explore 
the dynamic aspect of the relation between development, income inequality and subjective 
welfare over eighteen years of transition in Poland. Our main hypothesis is that the fall in 
self-declared satisfaction in the late 1990s is due to the rise in inequality and the way in 
which income inequality was perceived.  
2. The evolution of political attitudes in Poland  
The evolution of public opinion in Poland is reflected to an extent in the results of 
parliamentary elections (Table 1). The constant reshuffling of the political supply 
notwithstanding, one clear trend is the growing influence of Left-wing parties up to 2001 and 






 Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 













Left-wing  parties  11.99 27.69 31.87 41.04 15.31 
Liberal parties  19.81 14.58 13.37 15.78 26.59 
AWS -  -  33.83  5.60  - 
Agrarian parties  14.14  17.77  7.31  8.98  6.96 
Samoobrona -  2.78  0.08  10.20  11.41 
PC/PiS 8.71  4.42  -  9.50  26.99 
Other right**  21.98  11.18  5.56  7.87  7.97 
 
 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the State Electoral Commission (http://www.pkw.gov.pl/). 
Left-wing parties include SLD, Unia Pracy and SdPl. Agrarian parties include PSL and PSL-
Porozumienie Ludowe. Liberal parties include UD/UW/PD, KLD and PO. AWS was a large coalition 
of right-wing parties around the Solidarity trade union. Other right includes mostly right-wing Catholic 
parties, and some radically anti-communist and populist parties. See the description of Polish political 
parties in the Appendix for more details. 
 
A particular inflexion in voting behavior is visible after 1997. This coincides with the 
announcement by the newly-appointed Centre-Right government of a wave of second-
generation welfare-state reforms (related to health, pensions and education), which was met 
with some reluctance by the population. The spectacular upsurge in the votes for the Left in 
the following elections in 2001, and the large rise in the support for an openly populist party, 
Samoobrona, can both be interpreted as protest votes against the policy of the coalition 
government of AWS/UW, which was in power between 1997 and 2001. In the 2005 elections, 
the support for the Left-wing, in power from 2001 to 2005, shrank from 41% to 15%; this 
defeat was clearly the price paid for the budgetary discipline imposed during the process of 
accession to the European Union. It was also related to the outbreak of several corruption 
scandals (Freedom House, 2005). At the same time, two Right-wing parties, the national-
conservative  Law and Justice (PiS) and the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO), 
respectively tripled and doubled their scores. Law and Justice won the election with an 
electoral campaign focused on the losers from transition, and underlining the contrast 
between the “Poland of Solidarity” and “liberal Poland”. The negative outcomes of reforms, 
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1994 1997 1998 1999 2003
Future well-being in Poland requires
remunerating well those who work
hard
Energetic entrepreneurs should  be
remunerated well to ensure the
growth of the Polish economy
Inequalities of income are necessary
for economic progress
Large inequalities of income are
necessary to guarantee future well-
being
Inequalities of income are too large
in Poland
The government should reduce the
differences between high and low
wages
 
Percentage of people who agree with the statements indicated in the legend. Source: CBOS (2003). 
Several public opinion polls reveal the weakening of political support for reform after 1997. 
Figure 1 draws on a Public Opinion Research Center survey (CBOS, 2003) to show that the 
tolerance for income inequality, as a counterpart of “future well-being” and “economic 
progress” increased up to 1997, and then fell. The same pattern is observed for the belief 
that “energetic entrepreneurs should be remunerated well in order to ensure the growth of 
the Polish economy”, and to a lesser extent the belief that “future well-being in Poland 
requires remunerating well those who work hard”. By contrast, the opinion that “the 
government should reduce differences between high and low wages” gained in popularity 
after 1997. Finally, the number of citizens who declare that “inequalities of income are too 
large in Poland” increased after 1998. The same pattern is visible in the data from the New 
Europe Barometer surveys.
1 These data show that, the proportion of individuals who declare 
                                                 
1 The questionnaires and descriptive statistics are available at  http://www.abdn.ac.uk/cspp/nebo.shtml. These 
surveys were conducted by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Aberdeen. 
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that “incomes should be made equal so that there is no great difference in income” rather 
than “individual achievement should determine how much people are paid; the more 
successful should be paid more” rose from 24% in 1992 to 32% in 1998, and 54% in 2004. 
Figure 2, using another CBOS survey (CBOS, 2004), displays the proportion of the 
population considering corruption as an important problem. This sentiment increased 
sharply, reaching 75 percent in 2004. More generally it seems that the Polish population's 
perception of the fairness and efficiency of the income-generation process deteriorated 
during the period under observation, with a visible turning point around 1997. 

















The question asked is: ‘In your opinion, how important is the corruption problem in Poland: very 
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3. Data  
The data is constructed from individual-level surveys carried out by CBOS in Poland.
2 We 
exploit 84 surveys of randomly-chosen representative samples of the Polish adult population, 
consisting of approximately 1000-1300 interviews per survey, covering the period 1992-2005 
(six surveys per year). Even though some variables are available in earlier years, we choose 
1992 as our starting date, the year that GDP growth resumed after two years of significant 
decline. A standard set of questions appeared systematically: gender, age, education, 
residential location, labor market status, and socio-professional category. In terms of income, 
the best documented and most complete measure available is net total monthly household 
income per capita. This includes all of the revenues from the individual's main job, including 
bonuses, rewards, various additional remunerations, revenues from other jobs, including 
sporadic contracts, disability and old-age pensions, and other revenues and transfers. 
People were asked to indicate their net monthly average income per capita over the last 
three months. We use this notion of income, deflated using the monthly consumer price 
index published by the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS). The evolution of average 







2 The sample design is explained at http://www.cbos.pl/EN/About_us/design.shtml. Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
Fig. 3. Satisfaction variables, real GDP and the Gini coefficient, 1992-2005 (yearly 
averages) 
 
The data also contain specific attitudinal questions. We use three of these (recoded so that 
higher numbers indicate greater satisfaction): 
3 
• Country  satisfaction:  How do you evaluate the economic situation in Poland? 
Respondents could tick one out of five possible answers: very good/good/neither 
good nor bad /bad/ very bad. 
• Private  satisfaction:  How are your life and your family’s life? The proposed answers 
were: Very good/ good /neither good nor bad/bad /very bad. 
                                                 
3 The correlation between the three questions is around 0.3. 
15
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• Private  expectations:  Do you think that in the coming year, you and your family will 
live: much better than now/a little bit better/the same as now/a little bit worse/much 
worse. 
We match the CBOS data to macroeconomic data taken from official sources (GUS): yearly 
GDP, the yearly GDP deflator, and the monthly unemployment rate. 
We compute the Gini coefficient of income inequality using the successive surveys of the 
dataset. This measure of inequality is of “high quality” as defined by Deininger and Squire 
(1996): it is calculated on the basis of successive representative samples of the population 
and takes into account all sources of revenues.
4  
The descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Tables A1 - A3 in the Appendix. 
Over the 1992-2005 period, the economy grew at an average rate of 4.4 percent. More 
precisely, average GDP growth rate reached 5.3 percent between 1992 and 1997, and then 
fell slightly to 3.7 percent after 1997. In the meantime, there was a rise in unemployment and 
inequality. Income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient was 0.32 at the beginning 
of 1992, but reached 0.38 by the end of 2005 (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
Figure 3 displays yearly averages of the main variables of interest: country satisfaction, 
private expectations, private satisfaction, real GDP and the Gini coefficient. Although real 
GDP has been rising continuously since 1992, satisfaction with the country’s economic 
situation rose only up to 1997, and then declined substantially until 2002, with a slight 
improvement after this date. The patterns of private satisfaction and expectations exhibit 
similar movements, but of a smaller amplitude. Private satisfaction and expectations thus 
seem to adapt to shocks and return to a baseline level of happiness (Clark et al., 
forthcoming). By contrast, country satisfaction is a more political variable: it expresses 
people’s judgments about government economic policy. As such, it is more volatile and less 
subject to adaptation.  
 
4 Our measure of income inequality turns out to be slightly higher than the Gini coefficient for Poland calculated, 
for instance, by UNICEF (see Table A3 in the appendix): the difference may result from 1) UNICEF providing 
yearly measures while our data produces monthly estimates of the Gini, and 2) our use of monthly CPI.   Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
We consider the possibility of a structural break in the relationship between individual 
satisfaction and inequality, without imposing any specific date for the discontinuity. We 
instead treat the breakpoint as endogenous. As Wald tests constructed with breaks treated 
as parameters do not possess standard large sample asymptotic distributions, we use the 
sup-Wald test based on the maximum of a sequence of Wald statistics, with critical values 
from Andrews (1993).
5 
The basic regression we estimate is: 
Sit = aT Ginit +b1 Xit +b2 γT+ b3 trend + b4 νj + eit (1) 
where Sit denotes the satisfaction of individual i at date t (or alternatively satisfaction with the 
economic situation of the country, private satisfaction, or private expectations); Ginit is an 
inequality measure calculated for each representative cross-section; Xit is a vector of the 
socio-economic characteristics of individual i at date t consisting of age, age-squared, 
gender, education, occupation, labor market status and other professional categories, 
household income per capita and residential location; γT are year dummies capturing the 
general macroeconomic and other circumstances that affect all individuals in a given year; νj 
denotes region dummies; and eit is the error term. As the satisfaction variables are ordinal, 
we estimate equation (1) using an ordered logit model. We pool the individual observations 
from the different surveys, and cluster by cross-section so as to adjust standard errors for 
intra-survey correlations. Clustering is important to make sure that we do not exaggerate the 
statistical significance of those RHS variables which are more highly aggregated than the 
dependent variable.  
17
                                                 
5 The critical values from Andrews (1993) are widely used in formal tests of parameter stability. See also Bai and 
Perron (1998).  
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We test the hypothesis that the parameter on the Gini coefficient (at) is the same over the 
entire period. Consequently, we use a partial structural change model, constraining the 
coefficients of the other explanatory variables to remain the same over all of the periods. In 
other words, some parameters are taken as constant under H0 and H1. If the null hypothesis 
is rejected, we want to locate the break point. Specifically, 
H0: aT = a* for all T  
H1: aT = a1 for T = 1992 , …, T
B  
      aT =  a2 for T = T
B+1,…, 2005 
We consider different values of T
B from 1993 to 2004 trimming the sample at about 15% (i.e. 
leaving at least 15% of the sample either before or after the break) and compute the Wald 
statistic for each value of T
B in order to test whether the regression coefficient on the Gini 
estimated over the sub-period [1992, T
B] is equal to that estimated over the sub-period [T
B+1, 
2005]. We calculate the Wald statistic over all possible breakpoints and compare the 
maximal value with the relevant critical value (taken from Andrews 1993). If the sup Wald 
statistic is smaller than the critical value, the test does not reject the null hypothesis of zero 
breaks. If the maximal Wald statistic exceeds the critical value, the test rejects the null 
hypothesis of equal coefficients. We then divide the sample into two parts at the estimated 
breakpoint and carry out a parameter constancy test for each sub-sample. If the hypothesis 
of no break in the sub-samples is not rejected, we estimate equation (1) separately for each 
sub-sample.  
5. Results 
We first check whether the satisfaction regressions yield results consistent with those in the 
literature with respect to the usual individual level characteristics (see for example Di Tella et 
al., 2003). As expected (see Table A4 in the Appendix), we find a U shaped relationship 
between age and satisfaction, and a positive correlation with income, education, and higher 
occupations. Men are happier than women, a frequent observation in Central and Eastern 
Europe and in Latin America, as opposed to Western Europe and the United States (Graham 
and Pettinato, 2002; Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Easterlin, 2008; Georgellis et al., Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
forthcoming). People who live in rural areas are more satisfied and optimistic about their 
future standard of living than are inhabitants of urban agglomerations, who, in turn, are more 
satisfied than those who live in large cities. By contrast, individuals who live in the 
countryside view the situation of the country in a more pessimistic way.  
In order to identify a discontinuity in the relation between income inequality and subjective 
attitudes, we test for the existence of a possible breakpoint, as explained above. For country 
satisfaction, the highest value of the Wald test is 16.93, corresponding to T
B = 1996 (the 
critical value is 8.85 at the 5% level). For the relationship between private expectations and 
inequality, the sup-Wald test is 9.86 and also occurs for T
B = 1996. 
With respect to the relation between private satisfaction and inequality, the tests do not allow 
us to identify a breakpoint.
6 However, if we impose 1996 as a breakpoint, a simple Wald test 
on the Gini index leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of parameter equality over the 
two periods (1992-1996 and 1997-2005). This test, based on an exogenously given date, is 
less powerful than the previous Wald test. We thus treat the results for private satisfaction 
with some caution. Finally, we perform a parameter constancy test for each of the sub-
samples






                                                 
6 We believe that the relationship between private satisfaction and inequality is different from that between 
country satisfaction and inequality because private satisfaction mainly depends on personal circumstances and 
specific dynamics such as adaptation or a homeostatic mechanism of return to a baseline level, which partly 
isolate it from external circumstances such as the income distribution. 
7 See Bai and Perron (1998). 
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Table 2. A break in the relation between inequality and satisfaction. Ordered logit estimations. 
Country satisfaction  Private expectations Private  satisfaction 
 
 
1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
         
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Gini 6.402***  -6.199***  8.981***  0.258  0.627  -2.844** 
 [2.100]  [2.170]  [2.156]  [1.352] [0.898] [1.397] 
         
No. of 
observations 
30520 43061  27115 40435 32357 45335 
Chi2  3240601  9383 31416 41941 18861 26526 
Pseudo  R2 0.06 0.06  0.02 0.04 0.10 0.12 
Log likelihood  -34891.44  -50214.02  -32677.07 -44364.70 -34828.81 -47973.66 
The following questions were asked:  How do you assess current economic situation in Poland? 
Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Country satisfaction); Do you think that in a year your life 
and the life of your family will be: Answers from 1”much worse” to 5”much better” than now (Private 
expectations); How do you and your family live? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Private 
satisfaction). Controls include gender, age, age-squared, education, residential location, employment 
status, occupation, regional dummies, time trend, and year dummies. Gini coefficients are calculated 
for each successive representative cross-section. All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by 
cross-section. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.   
 
Table 2 shows the estimation results for equation (1) of the three different satisfaction 
variables over the two sub-periods 1992-1996 and 1997-2005. The impact of the Gini 
coefficient on the evaluation of the country’s situation is significantly positive before 1997 
(column 1) and then significantly negative afterwards (column 2). Columns 3 and 4 show 
individuals’ expectations regarding their living conditions. Our measure of inequality is 
significantly positively correlated with expectations up to 1997, but uncorrelated with it 
thereafter. This suggests that inequality is initially interpreted as an opening of new 
opportunities, but then loses this signification in the eyes of the population in the later stages 
of transition.  Finally, private satisfaction is initially weakly influenced by inequality. In the 
second period, however, the coefficient on the Gini becomes significantly negative (columns  
5 and 6). Obviously, the interpretation of income inequality has changed over the period 
under consideration, with a visible turning point in 1997.  
As we have already indicated, the subjective assessment of the country’s situation is a 
political variable as much as a satisfaction variable. A natural question is thus whether the 
negative impact of the Gini coefficient on the country’s satisfaction is reflected in political 
attitudes. In Section 2, we presented some evidence about changing attitudes towards the 
income distribution and the perception of corruption. To go further, we explore another Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
question included in the CBOS survey: “Can you describe your political opinions? Please, 
use the scale 1 to 7, 1 meaning left and 7 meaning right”. We assume that the percentage of 
the respondents who position themselves at the extreme left of the political scale 
approximately captures the radical rejection of liberal reforms. As illustrated in Figure 4, this 
percentage follows the rise in the Gini coefficient. It then drops after 2001, when the Right-
wing party Law and Justice won the election with a strongly pro-redistributive and anti-
corruption program (see Section 3). These results suggest that the weakening tolerance for 
inequality does affect individuals' political attitudes.  
Figure 4. Income inequality and self-indentification at the extreme left 
 
Percentage of respondents identifying themselves as extreme left. 
Robustness checks 
In order to make sure that the decline in country satisfaction and other subjective evaluations 
is actually due to the changing tolerance for inequality, we first assess the influence of other 
macro-economic variables, such as GDP growth, unemployment and inflation. Table 3 
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shows that including the annual rate of real GDP growth (panel A), the monthly rate of 
unemployment (panel B) or the monthly rate of inflation (panel C) does not alter our main 
result of the changing influence of inequality on subjective attitudes.  
Table 3.   Satisfaction and inequality, controlling for other macroeconomic variables.  








 1992-1996  1997-2005  1992-1996  1997-2005  1992-1996  1997-2005 
 
Panel A        
Gini 5.398**  -9.459***  8.814***  -1.835  1.026  -3.421** 
 [2.298]  [2.655]  [3.089]  [2.489] [1.106]  [1.346] 
GDP growth  -0.009  0.189***  0.035  0.072***  0.046**  0.064*** 
 [0.041]  [0.020]  [0.059]  [0.017] [0.020]  [0.009] 
No. of 
observations 
30520 43061 27115 40435 32357 45335 
Chi2 8831  2795  4445  3152  9414  21211 
Pseudo R2  0.06  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.10  0.12 
Log likelihood  -34911  -50670  -32695  -44553  -34846  -48019 
 
Panel B 
      
Gini 5.914***  -5.709***  8.411***  0.269  0.611  -2.814** 
 [1.872]  [2.202]  [2.353]  [1.326] [0.901]  [1.391] 
Regional 
unemployment 
-0.008*** -0.016*** -0.003  -0.004  0.002  -0.002 
 [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.003] [0.002]  [0.003] 
No. of 
observations 
30520 43061 27115 40435 32357 45335 
Chi2 1972145  9627  9451  4815  22850  28663 
Pseudo R2  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.10  0.12 
Log likelihood  -34912  -50204  -32699  -44364  -34829  -47973 
            
Panel C        
Gini 5.809***  -6.648***  8.373***  -0.038  0.638  -2.863** 
 [1.777]  [2.248]  [2.302]  [1.352] [0.905]  [1.366] 
Inflation 0.022  0.079**  0.015 0.033*  0.011  0.003 
 [0.022]  [0.039]  [0.043]  [0.018] [0.011]  [0.030] 
No. of 
observations 
30520 43061 27115 40435 32357 45335 
Chi2 435180  8314  56413478  5017  11296  26615 
Pseudo R2  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.10  0.12 
Log likelihood  -34915  -50207  -32698  -44363  -34828  -47974 
The following questions were asked:  How do you assess current economic situation in Poland? Answers from 1 
“very bad” to 5 “very good” (Country satisfaction); Do you think that in a year your life and the life of your family 
will be: Answers from 1”much worse” to 5”much better” than now (Private expectations); How do you and your 
family live? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Private satisfaction). Controls include gender, age, age-
squared, education, residential location, employment status, occupation, regional dummies, and year dummies in 
the middle and bottom panels. Gini coefficients are calculated for each successive representative cross-section. 
All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by cross-section. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 
1% levels respectively. Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
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Second, as the effect that we are trying to capture is the change in the perception of income 
inequality over time, we now focus on the time component of satisfaction. In order to isolate 
the pure time effect of satisfaction, we first regress satisfaction variables on the usual 
individual controls including date fixed effects.  We then use the vector of estimated date 
fixed effects and regress it over the corresponding Gini coefficients. Intuitively, this is 
tantamount to asking the following question: what is the impact of income inequality on the 
bi-monthly variations of average attitudes that are purely due to time. The effect of income 
inequality remains significantly positive up to 1997 and negative thereafter. Controlling for the 
monthly rate of unemployment or the monthly rate of inflation does not alter the influence of 
income inequality (Table 4). Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 show that the effect of 
unemployment on country satisfaction is similar to that of income inequality. It is positive in 
the first period, and negative in the second period. This is not particularly surprising, as 
unemployment is another facet of inequality. The initial rise in unemployment may have been 
interpreted as reflecting a necessary process of industrial restructuring required for future 
growth, whereas the subsequent deepening of layoffs produced a more pessimistic 
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Table 4. The role of inequality in explaining the wave fixed effects.  OLS regressions. 
               
  Country satisfaction  Private expectations Private  satisfaction 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  1992-1996  1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
               
Gini 4.840**  -4.950*  5.884**  -6.799** 7.880*  0.545  9.583**  0.161 0.719 -2.474*  0.676 -2.595** 
 [2.188]  [2.552]  [2.323]  [2.550] [4.033] [1.653] [4.234] [1.598] [1.018] [1.269] [0.969] [1.245] 
               
Regional 
unemployment 
0.094** -0.095**      0.152*  -0.013     -0.003 -0.004    
 [0.043]  [0.045]      [0.080]  [0.028]     [0.020] [0.022]    
Monthly inflation 
rate 
   0.020  0.083*    0.015 0.034     0.012 0.010 
     [0.027]  [0.048]    [0.049] [0.030]     [0.011] [0.024] 
No. of 
observations 
29  53 29 53 29 53 29 53 29 53 29 53 
R-squared 0.946  0.914 0.936 0.911 0.621 0.779 0.560 0.785 0.925 0.752 0.929 0.753 
F-stat 64.72 44.36  54.01  42.76 6.00  14.81 4.66  15.31 45.30 12.76 47.62 12.82 
The following questions were asked:  How do you assess current economic situation in Poland? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Country satisfaction); Do you 
think that in a year your life and the life of your family will be: Answers from 1”much worse” to 5”much better” than now (Private expectations); How do you and your family 
live? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Private satisfaction). Year dummies included. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
Gini coefficients are calculated for each successive representative cross-section.  Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
We then check for a possible effect of seasonality by including monthly dummies. Their 
inclusion does not affect the results (Table A5 in the Appendix).  
We also ask whether the changing tolerance for inequality is due to the reduced importance 
of the welfare state. The tolerance for inequality certainly depends on the extent of 
redistribution and social protection. Keane and Prasad (2002), following Garner and Terrel 
(1998), argued that at the beginning of transition substantial social transfers compensated for 
increasing wage inequality. The mechanisms of social transfers were thus critical in ensuring 
political support for reform. Their period of observation stops in 1997, but official statistics 
show that the share of social expenditure in GDP has remained stable at around 23% since 
1997. Hence, the changing tolerance for inequality does not seem to be associated with the 
withering away of the welfare state. 
Finally, we check whether the results are robust to the use of alternative measures of 
inequality. It could be argued that people have more local views of the income distribution 
and that the Gini coefficient calculated at the country level does not measure the level of 
inequality that is actually perceived. We thus calculate income inequality for different 
residential locations: large cities (over 100 000 inhabitants), smaller cities and rural areas. As 
shown in Table 5, the results are unchanged with this new inequality measure: the sign of the 
Gini coefficient changes after 1996 in the regression of country satisfaction; inequality stops 
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Table 5.  Satisfaction and inequality by residential location. Ordered logit 
estimations. 







  1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
 
Local Gini   1.914***  -2.396*** 3.545***  -0.793  0.288  -1.175** 
  [0.736] [0.892] [1.071] [0.630] [0.452] [0.511] 
No. of 
observations 
30520 43061 27115 40435 32357 45335 
Chi2  8321127  6299 1905 4251 28509  25201 
Pseudo  R2  0.05 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.1  0.12 
Log  likelihood  -34916 -50225 -32740 -44363 -34829 -47975 
The following questions were asked:  How do you assess current economic situation in 
Poland? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Country satisfaction); Do you think that in 
a year your life and the life of your family will be: Answers from 1”much worse” to 5”much 
better” than now (Private expectations); How do you and your family live? Answers from 1 “very 
bad” to 5 “very good” (Private satisfaction). Controls include gender, age, age-squared, 
education, residential location, employment status, occupation, regional dummies, time trend, 
and year dummies. Local Gini is calculated for each representative cross-section for different 
residential location: large cities (over 100 000 inhabitants), smaller cities and rural areas. All 
standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by cross-section. *, ** and *** denote significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
We have also checked that the same pattern holds when inequality is measured as the 
standard deviation of log household income for each cross section: in the estimation of 
country satisfaction, the coefficient on this measure is 0.001*** before 1997 and -0.001** 
after 1996; in the estimation of private expectations, the coefficient is 0.002*** before 1997 
and 0.000 thereafter. Finally, in the estimation of private satisfaction, the coefficient is 0.000 
before 1997 and -0.001*** afterwards. 
Alternatively, instead of looking at the impact of income inequality in general, as measured 
by the Gini coefficient, we could use a measure of reference income, constructed as the 
average income by type of locality for each cross-section (see for example Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2004; Clark et al., 2008). This average income can play the role of a comparison 
benchmark or an expectation (Senik, forthcoming). Including reference income together with 
own household income per capita in the estimation of equation (1), we check whether the 
relation of “reference income” to country satisfaction is the same as that for the Gini 
coefficient. Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
Table 6 shows the coefficients on reference income and household income per capita. While 
the coefficient on household income is always positive, that on reference income is 
significantly negative after 1996 in the country satisfaction regression, but significantly 
positive in the initial period (columns 1 and 2). Reference income stops informing 
expectations (columns 3 and 4) and exerts a negative impact on private satisfaction after 
1996 (column 6). 
Table 6.  Satisfaction and reference income. Ordered logit 







  1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reference  income  1.662* -1.555**  2.756***  0.409  0.039 -1.053*** 
 [0.886]  [0.656]  [1.065]  [0.483] [0.283] [0.322] 
Household  income per 
capita 
0.326*** 0.336*** 0.297*** 0.361*** 1.274*** 1.293*** 
 [0.025]  [0.022]  [0.034]  [0.021] [0.034] [0.019] 
No.  of  observations  30520 43061 27115 40435 32357 45335 
Chi2 569147.51  6218.23  100122.39  4112.35  28995.86  30429.20 
Pseudo  R2  0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.12 
Log  likelihood  -34908 -50226 -32694 -44364 -34829 -47972 
 
The following questions were asked:  How do you assess current economic situation in Poland? Answers from 1 
“very bad” to 5 “very good” (Country satisfaction); Do you think that in a year your life and the life of your family 
will be: Answers from 1”much worse” to 5”much better” than now (Private expectations); How do you and your 
family live? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Private satisfaction). Reference income is calculated by 
cross-section as the average net income per capita by type of locality (rural, urban or cities with over 100 000 
inhabitants).  Controls include gender, age, age-squared, education, residential location, employment status, 
occupation, regional dummies, time trend, and year dummies. All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by 
cross-section. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
These results confirm that the parallel processes of income growth and inequality were 
initially well accepted by Poles, who might have seen them as a promise of future shared 
gains. However, by the late mid-1990s, these high expectations seem to have given way to 
more negative attitudes fed by the rising intolerance for income inequality. In spite of the 
continued rise in average income, satisfaction with the economic situation of the country, 
expectations and private satisfaction all started to decline. 
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This paper provides evidence of the influence of income inequality on individuals’ views of 
the economic situation of the country, which can partly be interpreted as a measure of 
support for reforms. Income inequality is initially perceived as a positive signal of increased 
opportunities, but after a couple of years of rapid economic transformation, unfulfilled 
expectations and diminishing patience brought about a change in attitudes: growing 
inequality started to undermine satisfaction. Individuals seem to have become disappointed 
with transformation and skeptical about the legitimacy of the enrichment of reform winners. 
Various public opinion surveys confirm the changing popular opinions about the degree of 
corruption in the country and the desirability of high pay-offs in certain professions. Hence, 
the turning point in the tolerance for income inequality seems to come with the increasingly 
wide perception that the process that generates income distribution is itself unfair. 
The findings of this paper constitute a link between the literature on satisfaction and the 
political economy literature focusing on inequality and growth. It provides, from the “internal” 
subjective point of view of citizens, some evidence of the mechanism, hypothesized for 
instance by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002) or Alesina and Rodrik (1994), that growth 
that is accompanied by inequality generates dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction, in turn, can 
create political opposition to further reform.  
The results obtained in this paper offer a number of lessons for developing and transition 
countries: if it is important for governments to rapidly exploit the initial “window of opportunity” 
for reforms, it is also crucial that they adopt redistributive policies early on in the process, in 
order to ensure durable popular support for reforms. However, the paper's findings also 
provide lessons for developed countries, by reminding us  how important it is to ensure that 
the functioning of the market and the process of income distribution are perceived as fair and 
transparent. Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
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Brief description of Polish political parties (see Table 1).  
SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej), a social-democratic party which succeeded the pre-
1989 communist party PZPR. Initially used anti-capitalist arguments and opposed the 
privatization program; after 1997 the accent was put on economic reforms, on joining NATO 
and the UE. In 2001 the results for SLD include Unia Pracy (UP). In 2005 the results for SLD 
include SdPl (Socjaldemokracja Polska), which obtained 3.89% of the votes. 
Samoobrona – a populist agrarian party, proposing a radical program of isolationism, 
protectionism, and hostility to foreign investors.  
UD/UW/PD (Unia Demokratyczna/Unia Wolnosci/Partia Demokratyczna) – three successive 
embodiments of a centre party: economically pro-capitalist, culturally and politically liberal 
KLD (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny) – a liberal party: it joined UW in 1994, but then left 
UW in 2001; its leaders helped to found a new more conservative party, Platforma 
Obywatelska (PO). 
PO (Platforma Obywatelska) was created in 2001 – a liberal-conservative party. 
AWS/AWS Prawicy (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc) – large coalition of  Right-wing parties 
around the Solidarity trade union. 
PC/PiS – a popular, nationalist, conservative party; since its formation PiS has focused on 
fighting against the post-Communist left and corruption. 
Other right – includes mostly right-wing Catholic parties, and some radically anti-communist 
and populist parties. These typically reject liberalism, defend the Catholic Church and family 
values, and want to protect national interests against globalization, foreign capital, and the 
European Union 
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics per wave. Subjective variables, household income 















1992_01  2.002  2.679  2.753                  
1992_05  1.944 2.531  2.613 5.454  0.323 
1992_07  2.036 2.849  2.640 5.528  0.331 
1992_09  2.060 2.742  2.635 5.569  0.312 
1992_10  2.147 2.707  2.652 5.515  0.339 
1992_12  2.108 2.453  2.610 5.467  0.320 
1993_01  2.124 2.637  2.659 5.516  0.353 
1993_03  2.126 2.641  2.677 5.528  0.355 
1993_05  2.085 2.741  2.713 5.527  0.324 
1993_07  2.124 2.700  2.628 5.490  0.325 
1993_09  2.272 3.046  2.663 5.486  0.379 
1993_11  2.347 3.169  2.720 5.532  0.347 
1994_01  2.343 2.924  2.788 5.488  0.351 
1994_03  2.235 2.704  2.703 5.407  0.345 
1994_06  2.437 2.886  2.738 5.471  0.357 
1994_07  2.462 2.861  2.769 5.514  0.347 
1994_09  2.379 2.733  2.818 5.510  0.337 
1994_11  2.426 2.859  2.749 5.542  0.323 
1995_01  2.521 2.928  2.832 5.546  0.339 
1995_03  2.430 2.952  2.809 5.519  0.336 
1995_05  2.526 2.904  2.851 5.573  0.306 
1995_07  2.599 2.963  2.847 5.569  0.353 
1995_09  2.574 2.931  2.841 5.566  0.339 
1995_11  2.606 3.117  2.868 5.683  0.358 
1996_01  2.943 3.137  2.975 5.650  0.364 
1996_03  2.786 3.041  2.911 5.574  0.348 
1996_05  2.702 2.988  2.938 5.614  0.329 
1996_07  2.699 2.953  2.923 5.668  0.336 
1996_09  2.724 2.941  2.959 5.675  0.329 
1996_11  2.771 3.006  2.925 5.691  0.342 
1997_01  2.745 3.072  2.906 5.726  0.371 
1997_03  2.687 3.028  2.987 5.728  0.344 
1997_05  2.840 3.048  3.023 5.807  0.332 
1997_07  2.895 3.029  3.074 5.749  0.324 
1997_09  2.939 3.141  3.005 5.794  0.352 
1997_11  2.866 3.052  2.985 5.801  0.328 
1998_01  2.771 2.929  3.000 5.720  0.337 
1998_03  2.769 2.965  2.942 5.706  0.354 
1998_05  2.774 2.988  2.967 5.797  0.337 
1998_07  2.721 2.957  2.991 5.822  0.339 
1998_09  2.746 2.878  2.943 5.834  0.352 
1998_11  2.699 2.923  2.997 5.823  0.353 
1999_01  2.706 2.889  2.945 5.805  0.347 
1999_03  2.457 2.830  2.879 5.735  0.363 
1999_05  2.471 2.828  2.912 5.818  0.342 
1999_07  2.396 2.749  2.875 5.823  0.345 
1999_09  2.330 2.814  2.882 5.879  0.353 
1999_11  2.431 2.840  2.941 5.856  0.350 
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics per wave. Subjective variables, household income 


























2000_02  2.427 2.781  2.889 5.755  0.365 
2000_05  2.320 2.792  2.904 5.827  0.365 
2000_07  2.339 2.751  2.826 5.775  0.337 
2000_09  2.375 2.854  2.882 5.814  0.359 
2000_11  2.348 2.834  2.830 5.779  0.354 
2001_01  2.383 2.844  2.896 5.787  0.328 
2001_03  2.201 2.770  2.809 5.791  0.368 
2001_05  2.198 2.781  2.842 5.783  0.351 
2001_07  2.098 2.841  2.864 5.840  0.377 
2001_09  2.147 2.879  2.846 5.811  0.340 
2001_11  2.077 2.899  2.870 5.811  0.378 
2002_01  2.071 2.834  2.881 5.831  0.361 
2002_03  2.056 2.791  2.849 5.779  0.375 
2002_05  2.071 2.788  2.835 5.824  0.379 
2002_07  2.035 2.839  2.864 5.885  0.389 
2002_09  2.160 2.876  2.910 5.820  0.366 
2002_11  2.247 2.885  2.906 5.852  0.357 
2003_01  2.249 2.867  2.914 5.832  0.373 
2003_03  2.111 2.836  2.880 5.822  0.355 
2003_05  2.060 2.873  2.900 5.864  0.363 
2003_07  2.134 2.804  2.882 5.806  0.356 
2003_09  2.188 2.887  2.997 5.819  0.360 
2003_11  2.120 2.683  2.917 5.778  0.369 
2004_01  2.257 2.864  2.920 5.822  0.372 
2004_03  2.121 2.772  2.934 5.802  0.381 
2004_05  2.370 2.924  2.982 5.882  0.367 
2004_07  2.323 2.891  2.942 5.786  0.351 
2004_09  2.451 2.939  3.007 5.811  0.369 
2004_11  2.445 2.902  2.961 5.773  0.355 
2005_01  2.541 2.981  2.980 5.737  0.363 
2005_03  2.415 2.966  2.926 5.747  0.351 
2005_05  2.525 3.073  2.965 5.809  0.362 
2005_07  2.371 2.903  2.989 5.782  0.369 
2005_09  2.471 2.974  2.971 5.776  0.365 
2005_11  2.588 3.123  3.037 5.778  0.377 
2000_11  2.348 2.834  2.830 5.779  0.354 
2001_01  2.383 2.844  2.896 5.787  0.328 
2001_03  2.201 2.770  2.809 5.791  0.368 
2001_05  2.198 2.781  2.842 5.783  0.351 
        
The following questions were asked:  How do you assess current economic situation in Poland? Answers from 1 
“very bad” to 5 “very good” (Country satisfaction); Do you think that in a year your life and the life of your family 
will be: Answers from 1”much worse” to 5”much better” than now (Private expectations); How do you and your 
family live? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Private satisfaction).  Household income is the logarithm 
of net total monthly household income per capita, deflated by the monthly CPI. Gini coefficients are calculated for 
each successive representative cross-section.  Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
 
35

















          
1992 0.55 46.77  0.34  0.42  0.52  0.28 
1993 0.55 47.93  0.35  0.42  0.52  0.28 
1994 0.48 47.89  0.37  0.40  0.53  0.28 
1995 0.55 48.24  0.37  0.40  0.51  0.29 
1996 0.55 47.61  0.39  0.37  0.55  0.28 
1997 0.57 47.53  0.41  0.37  0.52  0.31 
1998 0.56 47.74  0.41  0.37  0.53  0.30 
1999 0.56 48.17  0.43  0.37  0.52  0.30 
2000 0.55 48.13  0.45  0.37  0.50  0.32 
2001 0.56 47.86  0.44  0.36  0.49  0.32 
2002 0.55 48.46  0.46  0.35  0.46  0.35 
2003 0.55 47.82  0.46  0.37  0.47  0.33 
2004 0.52 46.89  0.46  0.41  0.51  0.29 
2005 0.53 46.73  0.44  0.37  0.51  0.30 
 
Large cities are defined as having over 100 000 inhabitants.Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik 
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1992  0.08  0.34 0.11 0.07  0.06 0.14  0.06  0.03  0.15 
1993  0.05  0.44 0.09 0.03  0.04 0.10  0.06  0.04  0.13 
1994  0.04  0.45 0.09 0.02  0.04 0.10  0.06  0.04  0.13 
1995  0.06  0.43 0.08 0.04  0.04 0.10  0.06  0.04  0.12 
1996  0.08  0.37 0.07 0.06  0.04 0.10  0.07  0.04  0.15 
1997  0.08  0.35 0.06 0.06  0.04 0.10  0.08  0.04  0.16 
1998  0.07  0.37 0.06 0.05  0.04 0.09  0.07  0.04  0.16 
1999  0.08  0.37 0.06 0.05  0.04 0.09  0.07  0.04  0.16 
2000  0.09  0.37 0.06 0.05  0.03 0.08  0.07  0.04  0.16 
2001  0.12  0.37 0.05 0.05  0.03 0.08  0.06  0.04  0.16 
2002  0.13  0.37 0.05 0.04  0.03 0.07  0.07  0.04  0.16 
2003  0.12  0.35 0.05 0.05  0.03 0.07  0.07  0.04  0.16 
2004  0.12  0.34 0.06 0.05  0.03 0.07  0.07  0.04  0.16 
2005  0.11  0.33 0.05 0.05  0.04 0.08  0.05  0.03  0.17 
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1992 114243 102.6  13.1  .325  0.274 
1993 155780 103.8  14.9  .348  0.317 
1994 210377 105.2  16.5  .343  0.323 
1995 306318 107.0  15.2  .339  0.321 
1996 385448 106.2  14.4  .342  0.328 
1997 469372 107.1  11.6  .342  0.334 
1998 549467 105.0  10.0  .345  0.326 
1999 665688 104.5  11.9  .350  0.334 
2000 744378 104.3  13.9  .359  0.345 
2001 779564 101.2  16.1  .356  0.341 
2002 808578 101.4  17.7  .371  0.353 
2003 843156 103.9  18.0  .363  0.356 
2004 924538 105.3  19.6  .366  - 
2005 982565 103.6  18.2  .325 
 
- 
Source: Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS). Gini coefficients calculated using yearly 
average household income in our data. The estimates of the Gini coefficient from the 
UNICEF Database (IRC TransMONEE 2005) are based on interpolated distributions from 
grouped data from household budget surveys reported to the MONEE project. 
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Table A4. Basic regressions of satisfaction variables. Ordered logit.  







Gender  -0.061*** -0.119*** -0.097*** 
  [0.021] [0.017] [0.014] 
Age  -0.031*** -0.076*** -0.090*** 
  [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] 
Age-squared  0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Log household income  0.334***  0.336***  1.277*** 
  [0.016] [0.019] [0.018] 
Education  0.117*** 0.051*** 0.293*** 
  [0.024] [0.019] [0.017] 
Rural -0.152***  0.076***  0.236*** 
  [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] 
Large city  -0.022  -0.041*  -0.196*** 
  [0.025] [0.025] [0.022] 
Unemployed -0.032  0.01  -0.537*** 
  [0.028] [0.037] [0.042] 
Pensioners  -0.110*** -0.222*** -0.611*** 
  [0.023] [0.031] [0.030] 
Farm -0.173***  -0.05  -0.05 
  [0.034] [0.041] [0.048] 
Unqualified worker  -0.085**  -0.150***  -0.319*** 
  [0.034] [0.043] [0.040] 
Qualified worker  -0.02  -0.058**  -0.111*** 
  [0.031] [0.029] [0.030] 
Not working  0.133***  0.109**  -0.160*** 
  [0.039] [0.046] [0.039] 
Higher  professions  0.189*** 0.139*** 0.309*** 
  [0.038] [0.037] [0.035] 
Entrepreneur 0.041  0.380***  0.453*** 
  [0.047] [0.051] [0.049] 
Students 0.211***  -0.164***  0.161*** 
  [0.041] [0.054] [0.059] 
West -0.076**  0.056*  -0.169*** 
  [0.031] [0.029] [0.030] 
Centre-West -0.017  -0.096**  0.024 
  [0.030] [0.038] [0.026] 
Centre  -0.132*** -0.082*** -0.210*** 
  [0.029] [0.027] [0.024] 
East -0.204***  -0.136***  0.050* 
  [0.039] [0.038] [0.029] 
South-east -0.083***  -0.171***  0.061* 
  [0.030] [0.030] [0.032] 
South-west 0.149***  -0.023  0.126*** 
  [0.031] [0.033] [0.027] 
Time trend  0.003  0.009  -0.004 
  [0.007] [0.008] [0,003] 
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 [2,914]  [3,324]  [1,199] 
cut2:Constant 3,314  2,536  2,472** 
 [2,918]  [3,319]  [1,197] 
cut3:Constant 5,325*  5,121  5,339*** 
 [2,922]  [3,311]  [1,198] 
cut4:Constant 9,866***  8,287**  9,070*** 
 [2,914]  [3,311]  [1,202] 
      
Observations 73581  67550  77692 
chi2 4753  2651  17249 
Pseudo  R2  0,05 0,03 0,11 
log likelihood  -85274  -77445  -83015 
      
 
The following questions were asked:  How do you assess current economic situation in Poland? 
Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Country satisfaction); Do you think that in a year your life 
and the life of your family will be: Answers from 1”much worse” to 5”much better” than now (Private 
expectations); How do you and your family live? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Private 
satisfaction). Yearly dummies included. Omitted variables: men, education less than secondary, 
medium cities (less than 100 000), employees, and north region.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1%. Error terms are clustered for each cross-section. Error terms are clustered 
for each cross-section. 
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Table A5.  Country satisfaction: controlling for 
seasonality. 




 1992-1996  1997-2005 
 
Gini   4,893***  -6,445*** 
 [1,882]  [1,902] 
Month_2   0,07 
   [0,107] 
Month_3 -0,230**  -0,269*** 
 [0,107]  [0,103] 
Month_5 -0,207**  -0,185** 
 [0,104]  [0,085] 
Month_6 -0,088   
 [0,105]   
Month_7 -0,177*  -0,241*** 
 [0,104]  [0,087] 
Month_9 -0,237***  -0,117 
 [0,091]  [0,109] 
Month_10 -0,082   
 [0,107]   
Month_11 -0,209  -0,095 
 [0,130]  [0,091] 
Month_12 -0,16   




Chi2 7479  8344 
Pseudo R2  0,06  0,06 
Log likelihood  -34874  -50162 
 
The question asked was:  How do you assess current economic situation in Poland? Answers from 1 
“very bad” to 5 “very good” (Country satisfaction) .Controls include gender, age, age-squared, 
education, residential location, employment status, occupation, regional dummies, time trend, and 
year dummies. Gini coefficients are calculated for each successive representative cross-section. All 
standard errors are clustered by cross-section. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
levels respectively. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively..  
 